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1. Introduction to energy markets analysis 
 
In recent years, we have seen a growing interest in electricity and more generally in energy 
markets, due to deregulation and to increasing sensitivity towards the environment and 
climate change, particularly after the nuclear accident of March 2011. Electricity belongs, 
together with emission trading permits, to the set of commodities traded on power 
exchanges and over‐the‐counter. So just like financial markets, energy price analysis, models 
and forecasts have become increasingly important for both trading strategies and risk 
management. Consequently, research has developed in several directions, exploring models 
that range from economics to finance using both theoretical and quantitative analysis. 
Several papers have tried to explain the economic features and implications of market 
structures, designs and mechanisms, of bidding systems, and of strategies to improve 
competition. Others have focused on financial aspects such as price modelling, forecasting, 
risk management and derivative pricing. Following Lemming (2004), electricity price models 
can be categorized according to the input data employed to estimate parameters: market 
prices, that is, spot, day‐ahead and derivatives prices, and data on fundamentals, such as 
weather conditions, or supply and demand. This distinction forms the basis of two kinds of 
approach proposed in the literature: the first is based on stochastic differential equations 
borrowed from Finance and adapted for Econometric applications; the second is based on 
bottom‐up models that describe the dynamics of fundamentals to develop a model capable 
of reproducing and hence predicting price dynamics. 
 
The papers included in this special issue have been selected among those independently 
submitted and those presented at the International Workshop QAoEM “Quantitative 
Analysis of Energy Markets” held in Verona (Italy) in September 2010. All were evaluated 
through the journal's normal peer‐review process. The papers in this special issue cover a 
number of topics: EUAs and their impact on the optimal policy of a competitive electricity 
producer; electricity price dynamics with positive and negative spikes and forecasting 
models; make-up clauses in gas swing contracts; the existence of a dominant producer who 
may exercise market power or switch across technology regimes; market integration and 
electricity transmission by means of market coupling; and finally oil shocks and their impact 
on the economic growth of oil producing countries. 
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2. Papers presented in this special issue 
 
2.1. EUAs and their impact on the optimal policy of a competitive electricity producer 
 
Price modelling for emission credits has been concerned mostly with European Unit 
Allowance (EUA) prices. Mansanet-Bataller et al (2007), Convery and Redmond (2007), 
Alberola and Chevallier (2007, 2008) and Chevallier (2009) are among those who analyse 
EUA prices in a macroeconomic model. The extensive number of empirical studies on EUA 
prices might be due to the fact that price formation of EUAs is relatively easier to observe 
than other types of emission credit under the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. Certified Emission Credits 
(CERs) and Emission Reduction Unit (ERUs). The EUA market has been the largest 
international emissions trading scheme, comprising 11,000 installations such as power 
stations and factories, in the 27 EU member states plus Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. 
CER and ERU markets are relatively young. CERs have been operational only since the 
beginning of 2006 and the first ERUs were issued in early 2008 for Joint Implementation 
projects commencing in 2000 onwards. Nevertheless, since the introduction of CER and ERU 
transferability in EU ETS, the markets for CERs and ERUs have been growing. The paper by 
Falbo et al. (2013-this issue) follows this literature. It contributes to the debate on the 
grandfathering of EUAs in the EU-ETS. It has been largely proved that grandfathering may 
provide an incentive to switch to more pollutant fuels, particularly for energy producer 
companies. The authors apply mathematical and economic models to obtain the expected 
profit function of an electricity generating company using fossil fuel. Expected profit 
includes gains deriving from selling unused carbon permits on the market. Very 
interestingly, they found that, under some quite general assumptions, the profit function is 
not monotonic in the price of EUAs. This implies that it is more profitable to produce 
electricity with dirty technologies and sell unused allowances. The model was applied to an 
Italian and a German electricity producer using different generation technologies, 
conventional and renewable, and led to the conclusion that high levels of grandfathering 
can severely bias the profit strategy of generating companies by incentivising production of 
electricity from polluting fuels. In any case, the analysis of German and Italian producers 
yielded contrasting results: in Germany it is more profitable to invest in renewables for a 
wider price range than in Italy. This result supports the recent energy policy of the Italian 
government in favour of solar plants in the national generating mix. 
 
2.2. Electricity price dynamics and forecasting models 
 
The literature on prices in deregulated markets can be divided in two broad groups: spot 
and forward price modelling. While in the past, forward contracts were predominant on 
energy markets, in recent years spot markets have become more important and many 
papers focus on models capable of explaining spot price formation and predicting their 
evolution. The papers by Fanone et al. (2013-this issue) and Bordignon et al. (2013-this 
issue) can be placed in this research field. In particular, the first paper deals with the issue of 
negative prices frequently seen in markets where alternative sources of electricity mix. The 
forecasting method proposed by the authors is applied to the German electricity market 
where the recent Renewable Energy Act gave a big boost to the introduction of renewable 
energy plants. One stylized fact recently observed on some electricity markets, and 
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especially in Germany, is the presence of negative intra-daily spot prices. Negative prices 
mean that destruction of the commodity has more value than its creation: electricity is a 
waste product and is dumped on the market. One of the biggest issues related to variable 
renewable energy resources and competitive electricity market design is the potential 
impact of negative pricing on resource adequacy. Regions with high penetrations of variable 
renewable generation (e.g. wind) tend to have periods of low energy prices due to the fact 
that such generation has essentially a zero marginal cost (i.e. the fuel is ‘free’) and it is 
compensated for by the awarding of renewable energy credits. In fact, at certain times of 
the year, when renewable energy generation is high and loads are low, energy prices can 
and do become negative (i.e. a generator is willing to pay load to take its power). This also 
occurs when transmission constraints block the use of further downward control from 
flexible resources. The negative prices serve to establish a measure of the opportunity cost 
associated with a lack of dispatch flexibility. The methodological procedure proposed by the 
authors is based on a non-Gaussian Levy-based fractional autoregressive (FAR) process, a 
non-standard approach in the analysis of energy prices. The main goal of the model is to 
deal with negative prices and negative peaks. Price spikes frequently occur when some 
producers experience plant outages or when some consumers are in a period of peak 
consumption. The introduction of substantial amounts of intermittent power sources such 
as wind energy may have an impact on market prices. This proves the importance of the role 
of mathematicians and statisticians in the development of new tools that make it possible to 
explore the increasing complexity of energy markets. 
 
The prediction of electricity prices is discussed in the paper by Bordignon et al. They apply 
the forecasting combination approach to half-hourly prices observed on the British market. 
As it is well known, deregulation of the UK electricity wholesale market dates back to 1990 
when the UK government under Margaret Thatcher privatized the electricity supply 
industry. The authors estimate different models based on linear and nonlinear stochastic 
processes. Then, they combine the predictions yielded by these models using a weighting 
procedure previously introduced by Clemen (1989) and refined by many other authors. The 
paper's main contribution lies in its rigorous analysis of historical data that takes into 
account all the stylized facts observed on electricity prices: long term trend, mean reversion, 
different sources of seasonality, presence of spikes, high volatility. Secondly, the prediction 
strategy represents a clear reference for future works aiming at forecasting prices on 
deregulated markets; indeed, forecasting is becoming a crucial tool for generating 
companies and traders struggling daily to address the increasing uncertainty of energy 
markets and the corresponding volatility of spot prices. 
 
2.3. Make-up clauses in gas swing contracts 
 
The paper by Edoli et al. (2013-this issue) introduces a new mathematical pricing model for 
a specific clause that can be inserted in swing contracts, a very common type of long term 
contract used in deregulated gas markets. Swing (or fake or pay) contracts are long term 
(10–30 years) gas supply contracts. They allow the option holder to withdraw every day a 
quantity of gas subject to daily, as well as periodic (usually monthly or annual) minimum and 
maximum constraints. The flexibility of this contract accommodates the need to hedge 
frequent demand fluctuations that are in practice impossible to foresee in the long period, 
being linked to exogenous variables such as weather, economic circumstances, changes in 
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heating technology and power production, and so on. Make-up clauses have become a very 
important feature of most long term gas swing deals in the last few years, and particularly 
since the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting oil-to-gas price decoupling. The authors 
show how the pricing of a swing option with make-up clauses can be reduced to a stochastic 
control problem. Ultimately they solve the problem by adapting appropriately the common 
dynamic programming algorithm. The methodological contribution of Vargiolu et al. lies in 
the introduction of make-up gas debt as a new state variable. This variable is then 
embedded in annual constraints on the state space. The computational cost is quadratic in 
the number of years. Price decoupling is the factor that affects contract price the most. High 
interest rates decrease the make-up price. The paper offers a substantial contribution to the 
literature because make-up clauses could potentially become a key tool with which to 
address the challenges of future market scenarios deriving from oil-gas price decoupling and 
corresponding price volatility. 
 
2.4. Dominant producer, market power and signals 
 
The recent restructuring of the electricity sector has created new opportunities and new 
risks, considering that previously regulators, market participants and commercial 
organizations managed the electricity supply in a monopolistic and highly regulated 
environment. Hence there is an urgent need to manage the transition towards a 
competitive environment. The price paid for electricity may be affected by several factors, 
such as generators' behaviour on the allocation of production, and transmission network 
congestions; as Furiò and Lucia (2009) suggest, generation, congestion and market power 
are strongly interdependent factors. Previous studies that focused on market power relied 
on oligopoly theory to simulate electricity generators' behaviour (Green and Newbery, 1992; 
Newbery, 1998; Wolfram, 1999); others undertook empirical research (Bask and Widerberg, 
2009; Helman, 2006). At the same time, as result of market liberalization, former 
monopolists enjoy significant market power. Hence Vespucci et al. (2013-this issue) consider 
the existence of a dominant producer in a liberalized electricity market characterized by 
geographical zones interconnected by capacity-constrained transmission lines. They propose 
a model to account for the dominant producer's optimal bidding strategies, optimal 
resource scheduling in the medium–long term and the market clearing process. The aim of 
describing the dominant producer's behaviour is achieved by introducing a ‘mixed integer 
linear programming’ model, where mixed integer linear constraints and piece‐wise linear 
functions are used to define complementarity conditions and revenue terms, with the final 
aim of computing the global solution in a two‐stage procedure. The first step is mainly 
devoted to computations of hourly zonal prices given under the assumption of perfect 
competition, given hourly zonal demands and producers' hourly bids at plant level. In the 
second step, the authors identify hours during which the dominant player can exercise 
market power, thereby increasing his profits and modifying the optimal solution previously 
achieved by perfect competition. In solving the clearing of the market, the authors consider 
the interrelationships between the dominant producer's hourly production decisions and 
hourly zonal prices.  
 
The strategic behaviour of generators may result in production allocations that can directly 
affect final prices paid for electricity. Zachmann (2013-this issue) presents a new model for 
electricity prices, reproducing the merit order criterion for markets dominated by thermal 
5 
 
units and identifying a non‐linear relationship between electricity and fundamental drivers 
such as coal and natural gas, as well as carbon emission allowances. Specifically, he 
proposes a regime model for electricity spot prices that allows switching between producing 
technologies, and hence accounts for costs and emissions levels. In this way, the electricity 
price is defined as a nonlinear combination of fuel and carbon prices, differentiated across 
four identified regimes, with important implications for market efficiency, price forecasting 
and market power monitoring. Indeed, if electricity prices are not affected by fuel and 
carbon prices in a thermal dominated market, market pricing will not be based on marginal 
costs; in addition, the predictability of fundamental drivers could help in understanding 
when market power has an impact on final electricity prices. 
 
2.5. Market integration: regulation, transmission, and auctioning 
 
Competitiveness, sustainability and energy supply security are essential issues in the pursuit 
of European energy market integration and the creation of a single energy area (European 
Commission, 2007). To achieve this aim, there is an urgent need to upgrade transmission 
network capacity to allow electricity generated in one country to be transferred and 
consumed in another country; at the same time, increasing shares of renewable 
intermittent generation will require additional management. 
Energy markets were initially liberalized autonomously at a national level, with domestic 
scope, but there has been a growing need for an optimal management of cross-border 
transmissions and congestions. And indeed, economic assessment of the interconnectors 
required to transfer electricity between two neighbouring locations has been studied by 
Cartea and González‐Pedraz (2012); whereas Tangerås (2012) investigates the optimality of 
vesting regulatory power in a single supranational authority, since arguably a single 
regulator may be unable to manage the entire network. The author also demonstrates that 
optimal network governance of a centralized authority depends on the balance of different 
interests across countries. Apart from common regulations, market functioning in terms of 
competition among producers can be obstructed by limited transmission capacity at the 
borders of interconnected markets. Therefore two mechanisms have been put forward to 
solve the allocation of such scarce cross‐border capacity: the first is implicit auctioning, and 
the second is coordinated explicit auctioning, proposed by the European Transmission 
System Operators (ETSO) but not yet implemented. 
The latter system will allow countries to keep their power exchanges running, but if it is 
found to be less efficient than of the former system when it is not coordinated. This 
conclusion was reached by Jullien et al. (2012) who studied the European competitive 
oligopoly by analysing energy prices and transmission capacity allocations. They also 
propose designing a secondary market for used transmission capacity to solve the problem. 
Nevertheless, there is no clear consensus on the two mechanisms. On one side, the 
inadequacy of explicit auctioning has been demonstrated in terms of increasing price 
spreads (see among others Creti et al., 2010; Kristiansen, 2007); ambiguous results on price 
convergence (see respectively Zachmann, 2008; Bunn and Gianfreda, 2010); and in 
exercising market power, as in Bunn and Zachmann (2010). On the other side, it has been 
shown that implicit auctioning, intended as a mechanism to eliminate cross‐border 
inefficiencies by including arbitrage opportunities in auctions at individual power exchanges, 
produces welfare maximizations on some occasions (see Bohn et al., 1983) and on others 
does not reduce welfare (Chao and Peck, 1996). Similarly, some authors show that such a 
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mechanism reduces market power (for instance Parisio and Bosco, 2008) whereas others 
show the opposite (Hobbs et al., 2005). The implicit auction mechanism adapted in Europe 
is designed to include cross‐border trades in the day‐ahead action mechanisms on individual 
power exchanges to avoid inefficiency. Hence, Meeus (2011) studies and compares three 
different implementations of the implicit auction mechanism (no coupling, volume coupling 
and one way price coupling) on the Kontek Cable interconnecting East Denmark with 
Germany; he shows empirically that the one way price coupling performs better than the 
other two mechanisms. Other successful examples of implicit auctioning with price coupling 
systems are those within the Nordic area, those between Spain and Portugal, and those 
between France, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Nevertheless, a new result is presented by Oggioni and Smeers (2013-this issue). The 
authors analyse and simulate market coupling in a network of six nodes previously 
described in the literature, and a market split into two zones, assuming different zonal 
decompositions, coordination of transmission system operators, and a lack of strategic 
behaviours. Implementing a generalized Nash equilibrium and social welfare in a basic 
model with one single settlement for energy, transmission markets and congestion costs 
directly affecting electricity prices, they observe that market coupling can be weak and 
propose a benchmark for market efficiency using the nodal pricing system developed in US 
but not in European markets. Oggioni and Smeers initially consider a situation of perfect 
integration of TSOs, showing that the right combination of market coupling with counter‐
trading can be efficient compared to nodal pricing, whereas inadequate levels of transfer 
capacity can degrade welfare. Their analysis and the phenomena they observe could be 
extended to a multi‐zone markets that better represent reality, with expectations of 
decreasing capacity coupled with increasing congestion costs. 
 
2.6. Oil, dependency on oil and potential implications 
 
In recent years, market analysts, researchers, policy makers and regulators have been 
carefully considering issues related to security of supply, diversification of the energy mix 
and investments in renewables to reduce carbon emissions and mitigate climate change. 
Therefore agricultural as well as energy commodities have attracted increasing interest, 
given the ultimate aim of substituting or reducing market dependency on oil. However, after 
the devastating nuclear accident in Japan of March 2011, replacement of polluting 
technologies based on coal and oil no longer seems so easy in the light of the sudden 
setback in the nuclear renaissance, technical problems related to intermittent generating 
capacity, and the serious repercussions on food markets of the biofuels boom. Therefore, 
few papers have considered the various aspects of market dependency on oil, focusing 
rather on sudden price changes and hence testing the effects of oil shocks. Generally 
speaking, the effects of market dependency on oil can affect the formation of agents' beliefs 
when a general equilibrium model for macroeconomic variables is considered, given that 
the oil prices influence, through a learning process, both production and consumption and 
hence aggregate supply and demand curves, as in Milani (2009). Approaching the issue from 
an international perspective, and so in terms of effects across markets, trades or imports 
and exports across countries can also be reduced by oil prices shocks and in general oil price 
volatility ( see Chen and Hsu, in press). The dynamics of stock prices can also be affected as 
shown by Zhu et al. (2011) in OECD and non‐OECD countries. Conversely, in the industrial 
sector, Elyasiani et al. (2011) provide evidence on how variations in oil returns produce 
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excess stock returns in US industries, whereas Basher et al. (2012) study the dynamic 
relationships between oil prices, exchange rates and stock prices in emerging markets. 
In terms of the effects within a single market, interrelations between GDP growth and 
inflation have been investigated in Spain (Gómez‐Loscos et al., 2011), in Japan (Zhang, 
2008); and also in Greece, where real economic activities and employment have been also 
explored (Papapetrou, 2001). Farzanegan (2011) analyses the implications of oil shocks on 
Iranian governmental expenditures, showing on one side that expenditures on military and 
security budgets react significantly, while on the other side social expenditures seem to be 
unaffected. When oil producing markets are considered, researchers have tried to 
understand the relations between oil shocks and internal business cycles by providing 
evidence on the inverse relation between (high) natural resources and (low) economic 
growth (see among others Sachs and Warner, 2001). In this context, Cologni and Manera 
(2013-this issue) try to answer the important question of how oil shocks affect economic 
activities, and especially the impact of fiscal policy on consumption, investments and labor 
markets. More specifically, they provide evidence of the effects of oil shocks on the 
economic growth of the Gulf Cooperation Council oil producing countries. The authors 
specifically look at reallocation between private and public sectors caused by government 
fiscal policy; in the case of the public sector the authors allow for several aspects of 
spending policy, such as purchases, investments, and compensations. They therefore 
propose a theoretical framework based on a real business cycle model of macroeconomic 
activity to detect and explain sectorial reallocations following wealth effects induced by oil 
perturbations and fiscal policy. In detail, a neoclassical growth model is considered together 
with preferences, technologies, resource constraints and rules for public finance, where 
households, firms and the government are assumed to interact in perfect competition. The 
analysis, implemented both on annual data referring to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the period from 1994 to 2009, 
and simulation results, show that oil price shocks can have negative wealth effects on the 
private sector whereas wealth effects become positive in the public sector with the shift of 
productive factors from households and firms to government sectors. 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
 
We hope that these papers will contribute to advance research and analysis of energy 
markets by stimulating discussion and suggestions on the topics presented. 
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